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In the article by Metcalf, Dudek, and Willis we
have an interesting study of industry response to
hazardous waste disposal via various media. Using
mixed integer programming they show the adjust-
ments a firm will make to different standards and
disposal costs for sludge and wastewater. They
provide firm level evidence (in this case for an
electroplating firm) of the futility of a piecemeal
approach to residuals management which may only
chase residuals to the least regulated medium.
Specifically, with pretreatment regulations sludge
production increases significantly with a cross
media transfer of about 2570of total residual metals
to land-based sludge disposal. Indirect dilution be-
comes the optimal firm response to pretreatment
standards and high sludge disposal costs (which
could result from a tax on sludge).
Perhaps the most important conclusion from the
Metcalf, Dudek and Willis paper is the need for
multiproduct firm level analysis in order to predict
the impact of different direct regulations and eco-
nomic incentives (for example, effluent charges).
With knowledge of firm level response we may have
a better chance to guide residuals to those media, or
to recycling, so as to minimize the cost of achieving
ambient standards a la Baumol and Oates (1975).
The paper by James Opaluch presents some con-
jectures on the role of liability rules in attaining the
optimal future distribution of stochastic externality.
I have some personal reservations about the effec-
tiveness of strict liability (see Conrad 1980) in that
the incentive for optimal prevention provided by
strict liability will also depend on (1) detection, (2)
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documentation of damages and, in all likelihood, (3)
litigation. The fact that ;e are typically dealing with
low frequency occurrences, for which objective
probability assessment is difficult, means that the
initial investment in preventing a stochastic mishap
will be difficult to evaluate from either a private
(liability) perspective or from the socially optimal
point of view.
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the
Opaluch paper is the stochastic simulation analysis
which is the first attempt this discussant has seen at
attempting to calculate the social cost of anchoring.
Anchoring is a bias resulting from overly conserva-
tive adjustment of priors to observed data. The
simulation results show excessive oil spills resulting
from an overly optimistic view of limited preven-
tion and slow react ion to observed spill frequency. I
suspect this explanation goes along way in explain-
ing what some regard as an excessive number of
spills in U.S. coastal waters. Another factor might
be an overly optimistic view of the effectiveness of
recovery actions once a spill has taken place.
The analysis of bias-producing decision heuris-
tics is an important area of future research. The
cost of such heuristics, as they are employed by
externality producing firms or reaching individuals,
will be important in formulating environmental pol-
icy for managing hazardous wastes.
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